The Work Cognitive Science And The Concept Of Belief, For...

This paper will explore one of the three problems raised by Stich, in Chapter 7 of his work Cognitive Science and the Concept of Belief, for Fodor’s account of propositional attitudes. It will begin with a brief explanation of Fodor’s theory of folk psychology and his ideas of propositional attitudes, and will continue with an in depth analysis of Stich’s critique of Fodor’s representational theory of mind, specifically Stich’s discussion of the problems posed by ideological similarity and the consequences said problems have on the strength and validity of Fodor’s theory. Finally, it will conclude with my response, on the behalf of Fodor, to the problem formerly stated. To begin, it is necessary to outline the main concepts of Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind, as a grasp of Fodor’s essential arguments is crucial before we can analyze Stich’s reply. First and foremost, Fodor is a folk psychologist who categorizes mental states such as belief or desire as something called propositional attitudes. To elaborate, a propositional attitude is an internal mental state that an individual holds towards a proposition (the individual may have various propositional attitudes towards a single proposition, for example: I believe that the rabbit is fluffy. I hope that the rabbit is fluffy. There is one proposition, but two propositional attitudes: belief and hope.) These propositional attitudes can be thought of as the carriers of folk psychology, in that they allow for people to